Blogs, online forums, public spaces and the extreme right in North Belgium by Cammaerts, Bart
  
Bart Cammaerts 
Blogs, online forums, public spaces and the 








Cammaerts, Bart (2007) Blogs, online forums, public spaces and the extreme right in North 
Belgium. In: Carpentier, Nico, Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, Pille, Nordenstreng, Kaarle, Hartmann, 
Maren, Vihalemm, Peeter, Cammaerts, Bart and Nieminen, Hannu, (eds.) Media technologies 
and democracy in an enlarged Europe: the intellectual work of the 2007 European media and 
communication doctoral summer school. The research and teaching communication series . 
Tartu University Press, Tartu, Estonia, pp. 107-119. ISBN 9789949117451 
 
© 2007 The Authors 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/39665/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2013 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
Blogs, online forums, public spaces and 
the extreme right in North Belgium 
Bart Cammaerts 
You think that a wall as solid as the earth sepa-
rates civilisation from barbarism. I tell you the 
division is a thread, a sheet of glass. A touch 
here, a push there, and you bring back the reign 
of Saturn (Buchan, 1916). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As critical researchers we often tend to look at the progressive emancipa-
tory resistance movements first and foremost, and in doing so we ignore 
the extensive use of the internet (as well as other media) by non-progres-
sive reactionary movements, be it the radical and dogmatic Catholic 
movement, the fundamentalist Muslim movement or the extreme right – 
post-fascist – movement. As Kahn and Kellner (2004: 94) quite rightly 
point out: ‘the internet is a contested terrain, used by Left, Right, and Center of 
both dominant cultures and subcultures in order to promote their own agendas 
and interests’. A notable exception to this pre-dominant focus on progres-
sive politics is Atton (2004) who addresses the use of alternative (new) 
media by the extreme-right movement in the UK. Downing et al. (2001: 
89) also make the distinction between democratic and repressive radical 
media. 
This chapter explores a case that illustrates the way in which the 
‘global’ internet serves to some as a way to bypass ‘national’ legislation 
voted to prevent the incitement of racial hatred and discrimination 
against minorities. More specifically, a number of hate discourses in a 
blog and an online forum will be analysed in a period when a number of 
serious incidents shook the Belgian public opinion and caused very 
extreme discourses to be ventilated. This will be related to recent debates 
regarding the internet and public spaces, rationality versus passions, as 
well as the distinction between agonism and antagonism (Mouffe, 1999). 
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In this chapter the focus will be on so-called anti-public spaces, ‘placing 
themselves at the political extremes […] challeng[ing] or question[ing] basic 
democratic values’ (Cammaerts, 2007: 73).  
Inevitably this also brings into question cultural differences in relation 
to how absolute freedom of speech is, and how or to what extent a bal-
ance is struck between different rights, including respect for and recogni-
tion of difference and the right not to be discriminated against. 
 
2. AN ONLINE PUBLIC SPHERE OR PUBLIC SPACES ONLINE 
The rise of the internet as an interactive space, potentially global in reach, 
has led to an increasing number of scholars asserting the relevance or 
indeed irrelevance of the internet for the promotion of a democratic pub-
lic sphere and for the facilitation of deliberation (Wilhelm, 2000; 
Gimmler, 2001; Dahlberg, 2001; Young, 2001; Poster, 2001; Downey and 
Fenton, 2003; Dean, 2003; Dahlgren, 2005; Cammaerts, 2005). This has 
clearly re-invigorated debates regarding the public sphere and linked to 
that the potentials of the internet to foster a public sphere or public 
spaces beyond state and market that facilitate deliberation.  
Villa (1992: 712) describes the public sphere as ‘a discursive arena that is 
home to citizen debate, deliberation, agreement and action’. He thus explicitly 
links up the public sphere concept with the deliberative model of democ-
racy. From this deliberative opinion-making perspective, reaching a 
consensus becomes a process involving different actors, of communica-
tion and dialogue, not a procedure to count personal preferences. It is 
also informed by the rational argumentative debate, the respect for 
difference and the ability to change views based on rational counter-
arguments. The internet is by some perceived as an ideal platform to 
realise deliberation. Coleman and Gøtze (2001: 17) for instance assert that 
the internet ‘makes manageable largescale, many-to-many discussion and 
deliberation’.  
Contrary to this, much of empirical research into the use of the inter-
net to facilitate deliberation or public debate tends to counter these 
rather optimistic claims that the internet stimulates the emergence of an 
online public sphere. Regarding the potentials of the internet in view of 
democracy and public debate, Norris (2001: 12) speaks of a democratic 
divide between ‘those who do and do not use the multiple political resources 
available on the internet for civic engagement’. This creates imbalances in 
terms of representation, whereby those that participate in the offline, also 
do so online. This leads Dahlberg (2001: 10) to conclude that participa-
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tion in online public debates ‘is, in fact, both quantitatively and qualitatively 
dominated by those already powerful offline (politically active, educated, white, 
males).’ More recently, King (2006: 26) confirmed that ‘those people 
participating in political issues on the Internet were highly educated and already 
highly politically engaged persons’. 
In addition, many scholars challenge or at least question the potential 
of the internet to facilitate and enable (rational) deliberation. A recurrent 
observation is that much debate on the internet tends to take place be-
tween like-minded (male) participants situated in homogenic ideological 
frameworks and engaging in, what Davies (1999: 162) calls, ‘opinion 
reinforcement’. Wilhelm (2000: 89) and others, describe this phenomenon 
as ‘homophily’. On the contrary, ideologically heterogeneous unmoder-
ated spaces for debate, while being more open, are often confronted with 
flame-wars between (anonymous) participants (Eum, 2005; Cammaerts, 
2005: 70). 
While many proponents of digital culture and technological advance-
ment seem to argue that the internet has all the requirements to re-estab-
lish a Habermassian public sphere, others, such as many authors cited 
above argue the contrary or are more cautious in their assessment. How-
ever, maybe the real question here is therefore not whether the internet 
constitutes a public sphere, but relates to the inaptness of the normative 
Habermassian public sphere notion at a theoretical level to account for 
current political and social processes in highly mediatised and popular 
culture driven societies.  
Connolly’s (1991) and Mouffe’s (1999) work, advocating a radically 
pluralist democracy is highly pertinent in this regard. They argue, basing 
themselves on the work of Hannah Arendt, that an agonistic conception 
of politics, where political differences, tensions and conflicts (of interest) 
– still present in every society – are made explicit, exposed and mobilised, 
is to be preferred. Mouffe (1999) distinguishes two kinds of political rela-
tions: those between enemies — characterised by antagonism and an 
intent to destroy or eliminate the ‘other’ and those between adversaries 
— characterised by ‘agonism’. This latter perspective refers to a struggle 
of conflicting ideas, but at the same time a common framework of 
democratic principles. The aim of democracy, according to Mouffe (1999: 
755), should be ‘to transform an “antagonism” into an “agonism”‘.  
This shows an acknowledgement of a conflictual approach to the 
political and a fundamental critique of the deliberative model that tends 
to eliminate or eradicate power and conflict in a bid to achieve a rational 
consensus. Clearly the internet can be seen as providing opportunities 
for constructing public spaces online, but just as the offline public sphere 
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is deemed problematic on many accounts, so is an online public sphere. 
By speaking of an online public sphere, in a sense a normative distinc-
tion is introduced between what is being considered good and real 
democratic discourses – being rational, focussed on the common good 
etc. versus what is deemed non-political, titter-tatter in the margins, or 
passionate individual expressions without much value, defined as 
impact (Dean, 2001: 346–347). From this perspective, the diversity of con-
tent out there needs to be recognised for its political potentials and val-
ued accordingly, without restricting or limiting the political in advance. 
One of the questions raised here, however, is to which extent this form of 
‘radical pluralism’ is tenable when taken to its extremes.  
Radical pluralism, which fits rather well with the online environment, 
works best when conceived within an agonistic relationship between 
adversaries and competing, even conflicting, discourses, but acting in 
democratic ways (Mouffe, 1999: 775). It becomes more problematic in 
relation to radically antagonistic agenda’s defining ‘the other’ as an 
enemy to be destroyed and/or eradicated. Can and should democracies 
defend themselves against such harmful or as some authors call it 
‘wounding’ content (Matsuda, 1993), and if so where to draw the line 
between what is acceptable and what not?  
 
3. FREEDOM OF SPEECH CONTESTED 
The US First Amendment of the Constitution enshrines, among others, 
the freedom of speech and press. It states that ‘Congress shall make no law 
… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’. Some claim that the First 
Amendment discourse has to be seen as an ideology in itself, a doctrine. 
This hegemonisation of freedom of speech over other rights resulted in 
the impossibility to question that freedom. This leads Schauer (1995: 13) 
to say that there is ‘little free thought about free thought, little free inquiry 
about free inquiry and little free speech about free speech’.  
The First Amendment ideology disassociates speech from conduct, 
from being an act in itself. Speech is protected whatever the content of 
that speech is and only becomes problematic from a legal perspective 
when it is acted upon. In doing so, ‘the action that the speech performs’ 
(Butler, 1997: 72) is not taken into consideration. A fairly rigid dichotomy 
is constructed between the marketplace of ideas and social action. Fish 
(1994: 107) argues that: 
freedom of expression could only be a primary value if what you are 
valuing is the right to make noise; but if you are engaged in some 
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purposive activity in the course of which speech happens to be pro-
duced, sooner or later you will come to a point when you decide that 
some forms of speech do not further but endanger that purpose.  
Although freedom of speech is undeniably a highly valued cornerstone 
of US democracy, this right does not take priority over all other rights 
and liberties at all times. Anti-defamation legislation, laws against 
obscenity, consumer protection or even copyright law illustrate this 
clearly. Concerning the relationship between freedom of speech and hate 
speech the issues are much more complicated. In essence, as Matsuda 
(1993: 31–32) explains, the First Amendment doctrine can be summarised 
as: ‘people are free to think and say what they want, even the unthinkable. They 
can advocate the end of democracy’, and furthermore ‘expressions of the ideas 
of racial inferiority or racial hatred are protected’.  
Opposed to this individualised conception of free speech, detached 
from action and to the reduction of the commons to a marketplace of 
ideas, protected by the US First Amendment, is the more European no-
tion of the public sphere, embedded in values such as equality, reason, 
deliberation, protection, social contract and discourse. In many West-
European countries a collective harm-principle prevails over the freedom 
of speech principle.  
The initial harm-principle was introduced by John Stuart Mill, himself 
a strong advocate of free speech from a liberal perspective. He went even 
as far as defending the right of what he called ‘immoral doctrines’. 
Despite this, Mill (1978: 9) formulated a principle under which condition 
free speech could be limited, clearly challenging the myth of ‘uncondi-
tional’ free speech1: ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others’. However, given his liberal background, ‘doing harm to 
others’ has to be seen here in an individualistic sense and does not 
extend to collective harm. Much hate speech would be allowed as it often 
does not provoke direct harm to an individual. Nevertheless, the harm 
principle, together with Feinberg’s (1985) offence principle, remain 
important principles on which many advocates of certain limits to free 
speech base themselves. Another source of inspiration is Popper’s ‘para-
dox of tolerance’. According to Popper an open and tolerant society can-
not survive if tolerance is unlimited (1971: 265).  
In many European countries, but also countries such as Canada, Bra-
zil, Australia and New Zealand more stringent legislation to counter hate 
speech and the incitement of racial and ethnic hatred has been enacted. 
Some countries also voted legislation outlawing holocaust denial or 
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revisionist discourses. In Germany parties with a fascist ideology can be 
outlawed.  
It has to be stressed though that the effect the global internet and 
blogs have on these national or regional cultural differences regarding 
what constitutes freedom of speech is both problematic and empowering 
at the same time. While the internet allows dissident voices and dis-
courses that are radical to be present and active (unless they are filtered 
out by internet providers or the state), it similarly enables racist, 
fundamentalist and anti-public spaces to exist.  
 
4. CASE-STUDY: THE USE OF BLOGS AND FORUMS BY THE 
NORTH BELGIAN POST-FASCIST MOVEMENT 
4.1. Context 
The North Belgian post-fascist movement is characterised by a careful 
balance between on the one hand a strong focus on law and order and a 
populist anti-immigrant – especially Islamophobic – agenda and on the 
other a call for the break-up of Belgium and Flemish independence 
(Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). Its main proponent is the party Vlaams 
Belang, formerly known as Vlaams Blok. In 2004 Vlaams Blok revamped 
itself to Vlaams Belang after a conviction by the Belgian Supreme Court 
on the basis of racism and discrimination. The verdict read ‘Vlaams Blok 
is a party that obviously and systematically incites discrimination ... You treat 
foreigners as criminals, evil doers, abusers of the system, fanatics that refuse to 
integrate and a threat to the own race.’ (Hof van Beroep, 2004 – my transla-
tion). 
With more then 20% of the popular vote on a regional level and more 
then 30% in the biggest North Belgian city of Antwerp, Vlaams Belang 
has for some time been the second biggest party in the North of Belgium. 
The historical roots of Vlaams Belang go back to the collaboration of 
large parts of the Flemish nationalist movement with the German Nazi-
regime during WW II (Witte et al., 1997). While less apparent now, this is 
nevertheless still relevant as this dark past and its current articulations 
regularly causes embarrassment to the party, which incidentally has 
never unequivocally broken with that dubious past and those that glo-
rify it in the present. In the most recent legislative elections in June 2007, 
its share of the vote in Flanders reduced for the first time to 19%. What is 
missing from this brief and necessarily reductive outline, however, is a 
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succession of extraordinary and shocking events in the months preced-
ing that election.  
First, a local youngster was murdered in broad daylight in the hall of 
the Brussels Central Station (12/04/2006) after he had refused to hand 
over his mp3 player. This murder immediately precipitated bold and 
presumptuous accusations towards Muslim youth, while it later 
emerged that two Polish young men were responsible for this. A month 
later (12/05/2006), Belgium was left in shock after a brutal racist murder 
in the streets of Antwerp. A young man with an extreme right back-
ground killed a Caucasian baby and her black minder and wounded a 
Turkish woman.  
These two events, while very distinct in one way, came to be seen in 
relation to each other, not merely due to the fact that they happened 
close to one another, but also because of the public debate and outcry, as 
well as racist discourses they provoked. It is, however, not my intention 
here to suggest or imply any direct causal link between these events and 
the disappointing election results for Vlaams Belang some months later, 
which is all together a much more complex issue (see Elchardus and 
Pelleriaux, 1998; Swyngedouw, 2001).  
 
4.2. Racist discourses in online public spaces 
The language being produced by some bloggers or on online forums 
regarding the above outlined events is quite shocking. The examples 
below are of course self-selected and thus serve as an illustration of 
discursive transgressions and nothing more. The argument is easily 
made that these are marginalised voices and ideas that are present in 
each society and now find an outlet on the internet. Nevertheless, given 
the specific North Belgian context where such ideas are at least implicitly 
supported and promoted by the second biggest political party, this poses 
a direct threat to democracy itself.  
An additional element is that Belgian anti-racism (1981) and anti-
discrimination (2003) legislation is fairly stringent. The former forbids 
discrimination on the grounds of race, skin colour or national or ethnical 
descent. It also penalises incitement of racial hatred and hate speech. The 
latter is induced by an EU directive on anti-discrimination and extends 
this principle beyond race to include discrimination on the basis of (reli-
gious) beliefs, age, sexual identity, and handicaps. It also specifically 
links anti-discrimination with equal treatment in the professional and 
labour environment. In 1993, the Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities 
and Opposition to Racism (CGKR) was also established. The Centre 
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functions as a kind of watchdog opposing all forms of racism and 
discrimination (see http://www.diversiteit.be/). The CGKR also set-up 
Cyberhate.be, a site where incidences of racism and hate speech online 
can be reported.  
 
4.2.1. The murder of Joe Van Holsbeek (12/04/2006) 
Joe Van Holsbeek (17 year) was murdered by Polish kids in broad day-
light in the hall of the very busy Brussels Central Station. He was 
stabbed several times after he refused to hand over his mp3 player. Wit-
ness reports, the police, as well as the mainstream media, were quick to 
suggest that the perpetrators were youngsters of North-African descent 
and public opinion followed suit, condemning the murder, but by exten-
sion also the large Moroccan community in Belgium.  
One quite influential right-wing commentator and ideologue, Paul 
Belien, called upon ‘whites’ to arm themselves. On a collective blog 
(www.brusselsjournal.com), Belien (2006 – my translation and emphasis 
added), an ex-journalist with strong links to Vlaams Belang, asked to 
‘give us weapons’, because he claims: 
The predators have knives … From a very young age they have 
learned to kill warm-blooded animals during the yearly Sacrifice Feast. 
We become sick when seeing blood, but not them. They are trained, 
they are armed … The bastards who got everything in our society – 
free education, childcare benefits, social security – are today killing 
our children for an mp3 player. 
This posting shows how at a discursive level a clear distinction is being 
made between the identity of the self and ‘the other’, whereby ‘we/our’ 
is being constructed as good and morally just while ‘they/them’ are 
being projected as evil, dangerous and even sub-human.  
After a complaint was filed against him through the CGKR for inciting 
racial hatred and an interview by the police, Belien removed the above 
quoted blogpost. It now reads: ‘This text was removed on demand of the 
CGKR … Although I deny the charges, I will comply to this request’ (Belien, 
2006 – my translation). 
Another concern being raised by many, including the Belgian 
Archbishop and the prime minister was the indifference of people 
witnessing the murder, the fact that nobody intervened during the fight 
that preceded the fatal stabs and that those responsible were able to flee 
without anyone stopping them. On the Stormfront forum this led to 
accusations of cowardice behaviour by ‘the own race’.  
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Besides the cowardly politicians, we should also point to all those 
white cowards who are present in their ten thousands in Brussels Cen-
tral Station every day, of whom nobody ‘saw anything’ or had the 
guts to intervene (Wehrwolf_VL, post on Stormfront, 17/04/2006 – 
my translation2). 
Two weeks after the murder the police investigation revealed that the 
perpetrators were not North African, but Polish. The federal police even 
issued a formal apology towards the North-African community in Bel-
gium. 
We regret that the North-African community was immediately 
accused shortly after the murder, certainly as it now appears that the 
perpetrators are not from that community (Audenaert, 2006 – my 
translation). 
For some days after this announcement, a discussion was waged on the 
Stormfront forum doubting the authenticity of these claims. When it 
appeared that the Polish youngsters were gypsies, the rant on the forum 
continued.  
 
4.2.2. The murder of Oulematou Niangadou and Luna Drowart 
(12/05/2006) 
One month after the murder of Joe Van Holsbeke, a 19-year old Belgian, 
with an extreme right family background shot down three people in the 
streets of Antwerp. Hans Van Temsche wounded a Turkish woman and 
subsequently killed a woman of African descent and the white baby she 
was minding, after which he was shot himself and arrested by the police. 
This very act sent shock waves through the Belgian society, not used to 
street shootings at all. The Prime Minister was quick to link these mur-
ders to the extreme right ideology that drives and is being promoted by 
Vlaams Belang. In a press release Guy Verhofstadt (quoted in De Morgen, 
2006) stated: ‘These dreadful, cowardly murders are a form of extreme racism. 
It has to be clear for everybody now to what the extreme right leads’ (my 
translation). Not unsurprisingly these murders also caused, maybe for 
the very first time, real panic among the extreme-right movement. 
The first postings after this event on the Stormfront forum shared this 
pre-occupation of being associated with these racist murders. Specifically 
the mainstream media, which is considered to be biased (to the left) by 
the extreme right, was being targeted for strategically linking these cruel 
murders to the extreme right ideology.  
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If this is true, it is very bad. Undoubtedly the leftish press is ready to 
call Vlaams Belang co-responsible because of its ‘stigmatisation’ 
(Stoerman, Posting on Stormfront, 11/05/2006 – my translation3). 
The discourses being produced on the Stormfront forum, as in other 
extreme right forums, were very controversial, wounding, and insulting. 
I am reluctant to reproduce some of the postings in this chapter, as they 
are deeply hurting and offensive. However, in order to make the case of 
transgressing discourses, I deem it necessary to include at least some of 
them here:  
Pfff, it doesn’t keep me from sleeping, the only thing I don’t under-
stand is why he also shot a white child (Watch Out, Posting on Storm-
front, 11/05/2006). 
He could have at least taken out a few Jews as well. Antwerp is full of 
/ stinks of Jews (Hidrich, Posting on Stormfront, 13/05/2006). 
On moments such as these, I hope that that prime minister of ours is 
shot by someone with an extreme right ideology (NSDA-Pe, Posting 
on Stormfront, 12/05/2006). 
These discourses of hate and of incitement of violence are not only 
provocative, but transgress several boundaries way beyond what is 
acceptable in a democracy, at least within a European and Belgian con-
text. It is thus no surprise that these discourses were reproduced in the 
mainstream media, both in newspapers and on TV. However, despite the 
public outcry this provoked, there is/was little or nothing the authorities 
could do about it. Boonen, from Cyberhate, was quoted as saying:  
The internet reality is very complex. Stormfront is a good example of 
that. … that site, also the Dutch version, is totally operated from the 
US. Stormfront Flanders is in other words protected by the freedom of 
speech as described in the first amendment4 (Boonen quoted in Gazet 
Van Antwerpen, 2006). 
This exposure in the mainstream media, the subsequent public outcry 
and the formal complaints to Cyberhate impacted on the debate in the 
forum. Some became scared and sought re-assurances from others in the 
forum that their identity would not be revealed.  
Do you think [blocking Stromfront] is possible? I hope not. SF is as a 
second home to me. Would they arrest members of this forum? 
(Farkasfarsang, Posting on Stormfront, 16/05/2006). 
Others bashed the media for its left-wing bias and lack of ‘objectivity’. 
One forum participant directly addressed the lurkers that came to visit 
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the forum after the media reports. And finally, some also resisted and 
disassociated themselves from such comments. The quote below is an 
example of the latter: 
I’m sorry, but if the negative comments of some put us in a bad 
perspective, they are responsible for this. If someone on this forum 
writes ‘I had to admit that I slept well thinking about that dead 
niggerwoman and that crying Turkish woman’ then he doesn’t 
have to complain that it appears in the newspaper. How do you 
want us to be taken seriously if you write something like that? 
(NoSugar, Posting on Stormfront, 16/05/2006). 
It is very apparent that many of the forum participants, as well as blog-
gers, claim it to be their given right in a democracy to say what they say. 
At several instances the essentialist and wounding discourses they pro-
duce are considered to be ‘real’ freedom of speech. This is juxtaposed to 
a fake semi-freedom of speech, one participant even referred to the 
thought-police (thinkpol) of Orwell.  
The fascist identity and ideology of the forum is, among others, 
exposed by this double standard. On the one hand freedom of speech in 
invoked to promote hate speech, but on the other hand those voices in 
the public space that disagree or counter their discourses, such as 
journalists in the mainstream media and politicians, need to be censored 
and/or eliminated.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
As has been shown in studies into progressive movements, the internet 
allows dispersed activists to link-up and interact, superseding bounda-
ries such as space and time, creating subaltern spaces of communication 
(della Porta and Tarrow, 2004; Cammaerts, 2005). Likewise, for fascist, 
fundamentalist, and other ‘repressive’ movements the same applies. 
Radical, marginalised and atomised groups of people, often politically 
isolated, are able to link up through the internet in small communities of 
like-minded, such as could be witnessed in the Stormfront forum. Espe-
cially the comments of Farkasfarsang, calling the forum his second home, 
were pertinent in this regard.  
The cases discussed here not only raise seriously questions regarding 
the notion of citizenship and its relationship to territoriality, but also 
bring to the fore the issue of anonymity on the internet. As could be 
observed, the blog-posting was removed as this was written by an 
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extreme right ‘public’ (and identifiable) figure. The online forum, how-
ever, operates with nicknames and conceals the IP-addresses and identi-
ties of its members, who are beyond reach and untouchable.  
Given the deeply offensive and repulsive nature of many of the com-
ments being made online and the context in which they were produced, 
it is difficult to remain neutral here; rational detachment is not an option. 
Such vitriolic discourses should make any democratic person angry, 
demanding that action should be taken. However, whilst legal proce-
dures and regulation might be able to remove some of these discourses 
from the public space, the ideas and ideology behind these discourses do 
not disappear from the political.  
It might be useful in this regard to briefly refer to Butler’s (1997) work 
on ‘excitable speech’ in which she uses Foucault’s History of Sexuality to 
argue that forbidding hate speech all together (through (state) censor-
ship) above all aids in proliferating these discourses further throughout 
society. Butler is not per se against limitations to the freedom of speech, 
but points to the need to be aware of the difficulties of combating hate 
speech through legal measures and the practical consequences of this. 
She refers to questions difficult to answer outright, such as: who defines 
what is hurtful, offensive, wounding or injurious speech and what is the 
context in which such language is being used? 
This is, however, by no means a plea for complacency and ignorance, 
but to carefully think through the implications of intervention to exclude 
voices from public spaces of communication and interaction all together. 
Efforts to combat the incitement of hatred through democratic and legal 
ways should be encouraged. Such wounding discourses of hate do not 
belong in a democracy, not even in a radical democracy. As Mouffe 
(2005: 120) argues, there are limits to pluralism within a democracy: ‘A 
democracy cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as 
legitimate adversaries.’ But at the same time it has to be acknowledged that 
exclusion of voices and demands is always a political decision and 
should not be based on moral judgements. Mouffe (2005: 121) therefore 
argues for a conflictual consensus: a ‘consensus on the ethico-political values 
of liberty and equality for all, dissent about their interpretation’.  
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NOTES 




3  This as well as other quotes in this part can be found on:  
http://www.stormfront.org/ forum/showthread.php?t=293314 
4  Sofie D’Huster (e-mail interview, 21/05/2007) from CGKR confirms this. She 
adds that putting pressure on the provider that hosts the site, which tends to 
work sometimes, is also not productive in this case as Stormfront ‘owns their server 
and the telecommunication connection (the cable) with the internet-world’ (my 
translation). 
 
